Hofstra Law Review
Volume 42

Issue 2

Article 2

1-1-2013

Sudden Death: A Federal Trial Judge's Reflections on the ABA
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases
Mark W. Bennett

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bennett, Mark W. (2013) "Sudden Death: A Federal Trial Judge's Reflections on the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 42 :
Iss. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss2/2

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Bennett: Sudden Death: A Federal Trial Judge's Reflections on the ABA Guid

SUDDEN DEATH:
A FEDERAL TRIAL JUDGE'S REFLECTIONS ON
THE ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES
Mark W. Bennett*
I. INTRO DUCTION ...............................................................................
392
II. MY EXPERIENCE WITH THE ABA GUIDELINES .............................. 397
A. Important Considerationsin Death Penalty Cases............... 397
1. Introduction ..................................................................
397
2. The Role of the ABA Guidelines ................................. 398
3. D eath Is D ifferent .........................................................
399
4. The Importance of the "Team Approach" in Capital
Cases .............................................................................
402
5. The Appointment of Counsel ....................................... 405
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in § 2255 Proceedings..... 407
1. Introduction ..................................................................
407
2. The Role of the ABA Guidelines in § 2255
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Proceedings ............ 409
3. Two Examples of ABA Guideline 10.11 in Action ...... 411
a. Failure to Investigate and Present
Evidence of Johnson's Mental State at the
Time of the Five Murders .............................................
411
b. The Inadequate Mitigation Jury Instructions ............ 413
III. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................ 415

* Mark W. Bennett is in his twentieth year as a U.S. District Court Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa and has been an adjunct professor at the Drake University Law School for an even
longer time. He has tried two lengthy federal death penalty cases to verdict (both defendants
received the death penalty), and one of them through a lengthy and complex 28 U.S.C. § 2255
federal death penalty post-conviction proceeding, in which he granted a new penalty phase retrial.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2013

1

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:391

I have yet to see a death case, among the dozens coming to the
Supreme Court on eve of execution petitions, in which the
defendant was well representedat trial.
- U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg'
I. INTRODUCTION

On the evening of July 25, 1993, Gregory Nicholson, a federal
witness in a methamphetamine conspiracy case against Dustin Honken,
Nicholson's girlfriend of a few weeks, Lori Duncan, and Duncan's six
and ten year-old daughters, Kandi and Amber, were kidnapped from the
Duncan family home in a quiet Mason City, Iowa, neighborhood by
Honken and his then-girlfriend, Angela Johnson.2 They were driven in
darkness to a farm field, and one at a time, murdered execution-style
with gunshots to the back of their heads, and buried in newly dug
graves. While Honken was slaying the two adults, Johnson was
comforting the two girls by telling them that the gunshots they heard
were fireworks. Honken then returned to the vehicle, escorted the two
girls into the field, and executed them at point blank range. A little
more than three months later, on November 5, 1993, Honken and
Johnson lured the last remaining witness, Johnson's former lover, Terry
DeGeus, to a secluded site outside Mason City, "where Honken shot
DeGeus several times, then beat him with a baseball bat before he died.
DeGeus was buried in another shallow
grave a few miles from the burial
'6
Duncans.
the
and
Nicholson
of
site
Some days are more memorable than others. Members of the
"Greatest Generation," a term coined by Tom Brokaw, 7 will never forget
December 7, 1941 (the attack on Pearl Harbor), and members of my
generation still vividly recall, fifty years later, where they were and what
1. Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, U.S. Supreme Court, Joseph L. Rauh Lecture at
the University of the District of Columbia, David A. Clarke School of Law: In Pursuit of the Public
Good: Lawyers Who Care (Apr. 9, 2001), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?Filename=sp_04-09-Ola.html; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,
718 n.17 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742, 750 n.1 (6th Cir.
2002); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 942 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (Hawkins, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Hyde v. State, 950 So. 2d 344, 360 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).
2. United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 958 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson,
403 F. Supp. 2d 721, 742 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
3. Johnson, 495 F.3d at 959; Johnson,403 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
4. Johnson, 495 F.3d at 959; Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 742.
5. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 742. This comes directly from trial testimony in both the
Honken and Johnson death penalty trials that I presided over. See id.
at 732. Honken was tried in the
fall of 2004, and Johnson approximately five and a half months later in the spring of 2005. Id at
744-45,748.
6. Id. at 742.
7.

TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION 11 (1998).
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they were doing a little after noon on November 22, 1963 (the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy).8 Other than the birthdays
and anniversaries of loved ones, most dates are not memorable. On
October 13, 2000, I was sitting in the lounge of a hotel in Des Moines,
Iowa, waiting for my best buddy to have a beer. Out of the comer of my
eye, I noticed the evening news flash: the bodies of the two Duncan
girls, their mother, and Nicholson had been uncovered by state law
enforcement officials. A chill instantly ran up my spine. I felt as though I
had been hit with a bolt of lightning. I intuitively knew that my life was
about to change forever. Little did I realize that, four years later, six U.S.
marshals would be living in my home for months, and my daughter
would start her ninth grade year at the local public high school under the
twenty-four hour protection of those marshals. She could not even go to
the bathroom by herself. Nor could I predict, then, that this former
ACLU lawyer of seventeen years would order the defendant, Honken,
not only chained to the floor of the courtroom with a titanium bolt buried
in over a foot of concrete, but also require him, while in the courthouse,
to wear a stun vest under his clothing that could be activated remotely by
a plain clothes U.S. marshal. 9 Honken's jury would be anonymous, even
to me; they would meet at secret locations, changed every few days, and
they would not arrive at the courthouse each morning until shortly after
Honken was bolted to the courtroom floor.'0
In the course of these two death penalty cases and a 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 post-conviction proceeding, I published thirty-four death
penalty opinions, ten in United States v. Honken" and twenty-four in
United States v. Johnson.12 These decisions totaled 1333 pages--often
on multiple, cutting-edge
pretrial, trial, and post-trial federal death
13
penalty issues.
8. See id. at 8.
9. United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1039 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (ruling on the
government's motion to have defendant Honken wear shackles at trial, be bolted to the floor of the
courtroom, and wear a remotely activated stun vest).
10. I informed the jurors that their anonymity and the secret transportation locations were to
ensure that the media did not contact and bother them throughout the lengthy proceedings. The four
counsel tables in the courtroom were "custom skirted" so the jurors could not see that Honken was
bolted to the floor. Special sound-proofing and light reflection blocking were utilized, at my
direction, on the leg irons and bolt so that no noise could be heard and no light reflection could be
observed by any spectators or jurors. Years later, I was chatting with a news reporter that had
covered every day of the trial, and I asked her if she was aware that Honken had been bolted to the
floor or wore a stun-vest. Much to the credit of the U.S. marshals, she answered: "No."
11. 378 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Iowa 2004); see infra note 13.
12. 225 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1030 (N.D. Iowa 2002), rev'd, 338 F.3d 918 (8th Cir. 2003), rev'd,
352 F.3d 339 (8th Cir. 2004); see infra note 13.
13. See generally United States v. Johnson, No. CR01-3046, 2013 WL 1149763 (N.D. Iowa
Mar. 19, 2013) (denying, on "penalty retrial," defendant's motion to prohibit trial owing to
unconstitutional jury selection procedures); United States v. Johnson, 915 F. Supp. 2d 958 (N.D.
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Iowa 2013) (granting, on "penalty retrial," defendant's motion to dismiss "non-statutory aggravating
factors" concerning "perjury" and "distribution of methamphetamine after 1997," but otherwise
denying her challenges to aggravating factors, and denying prosecution's motion to reconsider that
ruling); United States v. Johnson, 900 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (ruling on defendant's
challenges to a capital sentencing rehearing and the second superseding indictment); Johnson v.
United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (granting defendant's § 2255 motion to the
extent that certain aspects of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in the original "penalty phase"
required a "penalty retrial"); United States v. Honken, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Iowa 2007)
(analyzing the procedure provided by Rule 10(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure for
reconstruction of the record when a transcript or other recording is unavailable); United States v.
Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (denying defendant's request for post-trial relief);
United States v. Honken, 381 F. Supp. 2d 936 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (denying defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal or new trial); United States v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Iowa
2005) (ruling on defendant's motion to exclude hearsay testimony during the penalty phase on
Confrontation Clause, Due Process Clause, and statutory grounds); United States v. Johnson, 378 F.
Supp. 2d 1049 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (denying defendant's renewed motion to strike death penalty
where government was no longer asserting guilt as a "principal"); United States v. Johnson, 377 F.
Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion to exclude
evidence and argument that she acted as a "principal" in the alleged killings); United States v.
Johnson, 377 F. Supp. 2d 686 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss alleging
failure to charge offenses owing to omission of "substantive connection" between killings and drug
conspiracy or continuing criminal enterprise ("CCE")); United States v. Johnson, 366 F. Supp. 2d
822 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (ruling, at pretrial, on the proper degree of case-specific questioning, if any,
that is permissible in the course of life- or death-qualifying prospective jurors); United States v.
Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (regarding intention of defendant, who had given
notice of intent to rely on mental condition evidence in the penalty phase, to assert her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination to questions about her involvement in the charged
murders during mental examinations by government mental health experts); United States v.
Johnson, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (denying defendant's motion to exclude evidence
of identification of remains where defendant has stipulated to identity of remains); United States v.
Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (ordering return to defendant of privileged
documents obtained by law enforcement officers); United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043
(N.D. Iowa 2005) (ruling on second round of pretrial motions); United States v. Johnson, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (ruling on first round of pretrial motions); United States v. Honken,
378 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (ruling on defendant's request for a "residual doubt"
instruction in the penalty phase); Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (ruling on the government's motion
to have the defendant wear shackles at trial); United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 970 (N.D.
Iowa 2004) (ruling on the parties' second round of pretrial motions regarding admissibility of
evidence); United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 928 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (ruling on parties'
pretrial motions regarding admissibility of evidence); United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 925
(N.D. Iowa 2004) (denying motion to reconsider order for anonymous jury and determining degree
of "anonymity"); United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 880 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (ordering an
anonymous jury and determining degree of "anonymity"); United States v. Honken, 438 F. Supp. 2d
983 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (closing hearing on government's motion for anonymous jury); United States
v. Honken, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss on
double-jeopardy grounds); United States v. Johnson, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Iowa 2003)
(denying defendant's motion to reconsider denial of motion to dismiss on statute of limitations
grounds); United States v. Johnson, 239 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (citing Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584 (2002), Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999)) (denying defendant's challenge
to constitutionality of death penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 848 in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Ring, Harris,Apprendi, and Jones); United States v. Johnson, 239 F. Supp. 2d
897 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss five counts of murdering witnesses
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On February 10, 2003, when the revised ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases ("ABA Guidelines" or "Guidelines") 14 were overwhelmingly
approved by the ABA House of Delegates, it was of little interest to
most of my more than 670 federal trial court judge colleagues. But for
my two pending death penalty cases, the ABA Guidelines would not
have been on my radar screen, either. At the time of their passage, I had
no idea how important the ABA Guidelines would become to me during
the two lengthy death penalty trials-Honken's and Johnson's trials
were severed by agreement owing to insuperable Bruton v. United
States 5 problems. 16 As important as the ABA Guidelines were to me for
these two trials, its importance became even more critical during an
eighteen-day § 2255 ineffective assistance of counsel proceeding, after
which, in a 276-page opinion, I granted a new penalty phase trial to
that defendant challenged on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations for noncapital crimes where no constitutionally effective death penalty was available at the time of the
alleged murders, and one count of conspiracy challenged on the grounds that it was untimely and
duplicitous); United States v. Johnson, 236 F. Supp. 2d 943 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (ruling on appeal of
magistrate judge's disposition of motion to compel discovery pursuant to stipulated order); Johnson,
225 F. Supp. 2d 1022 (regarding government's notice of intent to use evidence and defendant's
motion to suppress that evidence, resulting in determination of whether offenses charged in a second
indictment were the "same offenses" as offenses charged in a first indictment); United States v.
Johnson, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (ruling on motion to dismiss indictment for failure
to allege elements of underlying conspiracy and CCE, and denying motion to dismiss counts of
murder while engaging in a conspiracy, but granting dismissal of counts of murder in furtherance of
a CCE without prejudice to a superseding indictment satisfying applicable standards); United States
v. Johnson, 225 F. Supp. 2d 982 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (deciding appeals of magistrate judge's rulings
denying transfer to a different facility, granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for a
bill of particulars, and affirming denial of defendant's motion to transfer pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(i)); United States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 800 (N.D. Iowa 2002), rev'd, 338 F.3d
918 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964)) (suppressing
incriminating evidence obtained from the defendant by a jailhouse informant pursuant to Massiah);
United States v. Johnson, 131 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (deciding joint motion on
attorney representation regarding potential for conflict of interest in defense counsel's "successive
representation" of a witness and the defendant, witness's waiver of privilege by debriefing,
defendant's waiver of conflict, and prosecutor's appearance as a witness in a pretrial matter).
14.

ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN

DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.ambar.org/2003 Guidelines.
15. 391 U.S. 123, 126, 137 (1968) (holding that a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights
under the Sixth Amendment are violated when a non-testifying codefendant's confession
implicating the defendant as a participant in the crime is introduced in a joint trial, even if the jury is
instructed to consider the confession only against the defendant). Later cases modified the rule to
allow for redaction of the confession and a limiting instruction. See, e.g., Richardson v. Marsh, 481
U.S. 200, 211 (1987).
16. Both Honken and Johnson received the death penalty from separate juries in separate
trials. Honken, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 947-48; Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 736. I affirmed both
convictions in lengthy post-trial rulings-albeit Johnson's with great reluctance. Honken, 381 F.
Supp. 2d at 1057; Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 2d at 897.
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Johnson.17 On October 4, 2013, my colleague, Chief Judge Linda R.
Reade, in a 398-page decision, denied relief from Honken's death
sentences on his § 2255 motion."
The ABA Guidelines represent the Alpha and Omega of guidance
in death penalty defense, from the beginning of a capital case, with the
appointment of counsel, to the inevitable post-conviction proceeding
years later, which ineludibly involves claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.' 9 More importantly, for this Article, the ABA Guidelines
represent the good, the bad, and the ugly of what happens when the
Guidelines are ignored by trial counsel-and even by a well-meaning
trial court judge-in capital litigation. My perspective on the ABA
Guidelines is unique because they became effective in the middle of the
multi-year pretrial proceedings in Honken and Johnson.20 While both
cases involved their respective juries' independent findings that death
was the appropriate verdict, the arc of these cases, and the impact that
the ABA Guidelines had on them, was quite different. I chose
to write only on the Alpha and Omega set forth above because it is in
those two respects that I believe the impact of the ABA Guidelines is
greatest for my fellow state and federal trial court colleagues. I firmly
believe that, with greater attention to the Alpha-the appointment of
competent trial counsel, working together and with their experts as a
cohesive team, as the ABA Guidelines mandate-most of the problems
of Omega-involving post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel--can be avoided.2

17. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 680, 920.
18. Honken v. United States, No. CV10-3074, slip op. at 393-98 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 4, 2013).
For the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals's decision, which otherwise affirmed Johnson's convictions
and death sentences on direct appeal, see United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 980-82 (8th Cir.
2007). Chief Judge Reade vacated the conspiracy murder charges against Honken, because they
were multiplicitous of the CCE murder charges, but, she otherwise denied Honken's § 2255 motion,
and denied Honken a certificate of appealability on all issues. Honken, No. CV10-3074, slip op. at
393-98.
19. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 1.1 history of guideline, at 921.
20. See, e.g., United States v. Honken, 378 F. Supp. 2d 880, 924 (N.D. Iowa 2004); United
States v. Johnson, 196 F. Supp. 2d 795, 800 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
21. See infra Part II.B.
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II. MY EXPERIENCE

WITH THE

ABA GUIDELINES

A. Important Considerationsin Death Penalty Cases
1. Introduction
Currently, there are only fifty-eight defendants on federal death
row.22 Obviously, there are more federal capital cases than this.23 Many
death eligible defendants plead out.2 4 While very few death penalty trials
result in a not guilty merits phase verdict, many penalty phase verdicts
result in a sentence of less than death.2 5 Indeed, the vast majority of
federal district court judges have never had a death penalty case proceed
past the Attorney General's authorization process. 26 I am equally
confident that the vast majority of district court judges, prior to their
appointment, never handled a death penalty case. Thus, there is simply
nothing in most of these judges' prior experiences that adequately
prepares them to preside over a federal death penalty case. I had
significant experience doing federal criminal defense work prior to
becoming a judge, and the Northern District of Iowa's criminal caseload
per judge has averaged in the top ten of the nation's ninety-four federal
districts during my tenure as a federal judge.27 Also, by the time I was
22. See
Iowa:
The
Fact
Sheet,
DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CENTER,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated Dec. 12, 2013).
23. From 1989 through 2009, approximately 2975 federal criminal cases were "death
eligible." Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of Capital
Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 635, 687 (2013). "By the end of 2009, 262 authorized
defendants had been tried, and sixty-eight of those who proceeded to trial were sentenced to
death.... A scant two percent of the 'death-eligible' federal defendants received the death penalty."
Id. at 687-88 (footnotes omitted).
24. See, e.g., id at 688-92.
25. See, e.g., id at 689.
26. This authorization process has been described as follows:
The Department of Justice authorization procedures are set forth in section 9-10.000
of the United States Attorney's Manual. Promulgated in early 1995, the Department of
Justice Death Penalty Guidelines and Procedures are intended to set forth the criteria to
be utilized by local United States Attorneys and the DOJ in deciding whether to seek the
imposition of the death penalty under federal law. The procedures also outline certain
procedural steps to which United States Attorneys and Main Justice are supposed to
adhere in considering death penalty authorization requests.
Department of Justice Authorization Procedures, FED. DEATH PENALTY RESOURCE COUNS.,
http://www.capdeffet.org/fdprc/links.aspxmenu id=78&id=2278 (last visited Feb. 16, 2014); see
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors on Changes to Death
Penalty Protocol (July 27, 2011), available at www.deatbpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
FedDPRules2011 .pdf.
27. See Federal Court Management Statistics 2010: District Courts, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsd20l0Sep.pl (last visited Feb. 16, 2014)
(showing that, between 2005 and 2010, the Northern District of Iowa ranked ninth in criminal cases
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faced with my two death penalty trials, I had presided over many
complex, multi-defendant criminal trials, and had sentenced nearly 2000
defendants. However, I still felt grossly ill prepared to manage a federal
death penalty case. Starting about a year before Honken's trial, in order
to prepare for the onslaught of new issues I knew that I would have to
face, I began reading several law review articles each week, covering a
wide array of death penalty topics.
2. The Role of the ABA Guidelines
In Johnson's § 2255 proceeding, after discussing numerous court
decisions involving the proper role of the ABA Guidelines, I held that, "I
will consider the ABA Guidelines as guides to whether counsel made
'objectively reasonable choices."' 28 However, before discussing the
per judge).
28. Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 744 (N.D. Iowa 2012). My full discussion
of the role of the ABA Guidelines in Johnson's § 2255 proceeding was as follows:
In both her Second Amended § 2255 Motion and her Corrected Post-Hearing Brief,
Johnson has repeatedly measured the performance of her trial counsel against the ABA
Guidelines For Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases. Indeed, in the course of the episodic evidentiary hearing in this case, Johnson's
current habeas counsel went so far as to assert that "[t]here are circuit cases.., that have
said these are binding standards that must be followed." Johnson's counsel cited no cases
so stating in her Corrected Post-Hearing Brief, however. Instead, she cited cases in
which she contends that the "U.S. Supreme Court has observed that the ABA Death
Penalty Guidelines establish the 'prevailing norms of practice' that serve to measure
counsel's performance under the Sixth Amendment." The respondent contends that the
Supreme Court has clearly rejected Johnson's assertion that the ABA Guidelines
constitute "binding standards."
Although I observed ... that my duty of "heightened attention parallels the
heightened demands on counsel in a capital case," that does not necessarily mean that the
ABA standards or guidelines for death penalty counsel establish binding standards for
the "performance" prong of the Stricklandanalysis in a death penalty case.
As the Supreme Court recently explained, "Restatements of professional
standards... can be useful as 'guides' to what reasonableness [of counsel's
performance] entails, but only to the extent they describe the professional norms
prevailing when the representation took place." The Court found in Bobby that the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals had ignored this principle by relying on a version of the ABA
Guidelines announced 18 years after the defendant went to trial. ...
... The Supreme Court's decision in Bobby makes clear that reliance on either the 1989
or the 2003 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases as "binding" or "inexorable commands" would be to repeat the error of
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals; the ABA Guidelines are "'only guides' to what
reasonableness means, not its definition." The overriding standard remains whether
counsel made "'objectively reasonable choices."'
Even Johnson's retrenched position on the relevance of the ABA Guidelines goes
too far. Those Guidelines do not necessarily "establish the 'prevailing norms of
practice."' Rather, the ABA Guidelines must be shown to [1] reflect "prevailing norms
of practice," and [2] reflect "standard practice," and [3] "not be so detailed that they
would [a] 'interfere with the constitutionally protected independence of counsel and
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application of the ABA Guidelines to death penalty post-conviction
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, I first turn to a discussion of
why death is different, the critical importance of the "team approach" to
capital litigation, and the all too often overlooked role of the ABA
Guidelines on appointment of counsel-one of the most critical facets of
any death penalty proceeding.2 9
3. Death Is Different
In describing death penalty cases, as compared to other types of
criminal cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed on many
occasions, albeit with different phraseology, that: death is different.3 °
[b] restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical decisions."' Johnson
comes nearer the mark when she asserts, "As all of [her] Stricklandexperts testified, and
as the trial team itself acknowledged, the prevailing standards of practice governing
death penalty litigation are set forth in the [1989 and 2003 ABA Guidelines]." That is,
she has pointed to evidence suggesting that the ABA Guidelines do reflect "prevailing
norms" and "standard practice."
Thus, I will consider the ABA Guidelines as guides to whether counsel made
"objectively reasonable choices," subject to my determination of whether specific ABA
Guidelines are so detailed that they interfere with the constitutionally protected
independence of counsel or restrict counsel's wide latitude to make tactical decisions.
Id. at 742-44 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4,
5-10 (2009), and Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 939 (10th Cir. 2004)) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-89 (1984)).
29. See supraPart II.A.
30. Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-DifferentJurisprudenceand the Role of the Capital Jury, 2
OHIO ST. J. CRim. L. 117, 117 & n.1 (2004). Jeffrey Abramson's article contains a footnote
collecting Supreme Court Justices' views that "the death penalty is 'qualitatively different' from all
other punishments," which reads:
See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-89 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[d]eath is a unique punishment"; "[d]eath ... is in a class by itself'); id. at 306
(Stewart, J., concurring) ("penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind"); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)
(joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) ("penalty of death is different in kind
from any other punishment" and emphasizing its "uniqueness"); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)
("penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however
long"); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) ("qualitatively different"); Spaziano
v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984) (citing Court's prior recognition of the "qualitative
difference of the death penalty"); id. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("death penalty is qualitatively different ... and hence must be
accompanied by unique safeguards"); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 463 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing "previously unquestioned principle" that unique
safeguards necessary because death penalty is "qualitatively different"); McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 340 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("hardly needs reiteration that
this Court has consistently acknowledged the uniqueness of the punishment of death");
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 337 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (majority opinion
holding it cruel and unusual to punish retarded persons with death is "pinnacle
of. . . death-is-different jurisprudence"); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-06 (2002)
("no doubt that '[d]eath is different"') (citation omitted); id. at 614 (Breyer, J.,
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Based on my experience, this is true for every aspect of death penalty
proceedings. This has been aptly described, in part, by the scholar,
Douglas W. Vick:
Every task ordinarily performed in the representation of a criminal
defendant is more difficult and time-consuming when the defendant is
facing execution. The responsibilities thrust upon defense counsel in a
capital case carry with them psychological and emotional pressures
unknown elsewhere in the law. In addition, defending a capital case is
an intellectually rigorous enterprise, requiring command of the rules
unique to capital litigation and constant vigilance in keeping abreast31 of
new developments in a volatile and highly nuanced area of the law.
It is critically important for those judges who do not have
experience in death penalty cases to fully appreciate the magnitude of
the "death is different" phenomenon in terms of appointing a defense
trial team-including an experienced mitigation specialist and an
experienced top-flight investigator-and in reviewing the significant
number of expert witness requests that the defense trial team will likely
ask for.32 The ABA Guidelines are of great assistance in helping trial
court judges fully appreciate the critical distinction between death
penalty prosecutions and our usual fare of criminal cases. This
distinction, specifically as it relates to legal death penalty issues, was
recognized by Professor Eric M. Freedman in the introduction to the
Summer 2003 Issue of the Hofstra Law Review-wherein the revised
ABA Guidelines were published-in which he wrote:
One element of [the] consensus [about what is required to provide
effective death penalty defense representation] is that "the unique
characteristics of death penalty law and practice"--including the
extreme fluidity of the law and the potentially fatal consequences of
erroneous legal predictions-impose a stringent "duty to assert legal
claims" even where "their prospects of immediate success on the
merits are at best modest." An effective capital defense lawyer is
always testing-and
often explicitly challenging-the limits of
33
existing law.

concurring in the judgment) ("Eighth Amendment requires States to apply special
procedural safeguards when they seek the death penalty.").
Id.
31. Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and
ArbitraryDeathSentences, 43 BUFF. L. REv. 329, 357-58 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
32. Stetler & Wendel, supra note 23, at 674-76.
33. Eric M. Freedman, Introduction, 31 HOFsTRA L. REV. 903, 903-04 (2003) (footnotes
omitted). However, I strongly disagree with Professor Monroe H. Freedman's notion that capital
defenders have an obligation to raise "frivolous" issues. See Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional
Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1177-78
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Writing in the same issue of the Hofstra Law Review, Robin M.
Maher observed:
As the Guidelines emphasize, that obligation [to provide
experienced and well-trained capital defenders] cannot be met by
piecemeal efforts aimed at particular cases, but requires sustained
institutional commitment. All of us-bar associations, judges,
legislators, and lawyers-must work together to bring about badly
needed reform of our capital defender systems.
The ABA Guidelines provide a blueprint for that reform.34
These observations by Freedman and Maher are as true today as they
were in 2003. In setting aside Johnson's death penalty verdict, in my
§ 2255 ineffective assistance of counsel ruling of 2012, I observed that
the "death is different" mantra applies with equal force not only to postconviction proceedings, but to my duty as the post-conviction judge:
Thus, my "review in this [habeas] case is predicated on the
awesome responsibility entrusted to the federal judiciary in its habeas
jurisdiction .... [My] duty to search for constitutional error with
painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case."'
My duty of "heightened attention
parallels the heightened demands on
' 35
counsel in a capital case."
It is precisely because "death is different"-as Justice Potter Stewart
noted, "it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is

(2003). Perhaps my disagreement is more in how to parse the phrase "frivolous" than with this
conclusion: "Counsel in a capital case must, as a matter of professional responsibility, raise every
issue at every level of the proceedings that might conceivably persuade even one judge in an
appeals court or in the Supreme Court, in direct appeal or... collateral attack on a conviction or
sentence." Id. at 1179. This, I agree with. This standard, in my view, excludes most frivolous
arguments. I encounter a lot of knowledgeable lawyers, -but very few wise ones. In my view, wise
lawyers do not raise purely frivolous issues. As the saying goes: Knowledge is recognizing that a
tomato is a fruit. Wisdom is not putting it in a fruit salad. Even death penalty defense lawyers can
lose their credibility, which is one of their most important assets, by putting too many tomatoes in
the fruit salad. In practical terms, if a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court rejected the identical issue
two years ago, it is frivolous to raise it now. If the decision was 7-2, one's unyielding optimism
might make the argument non-frivolous.
34. Robin M. Maher, 'The Guiding Hand of Counsel' and the ABA Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1091, 1094-95 (2003) (footnote omitted).
35. Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 739 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (quoting Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999),
and Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 939 (10th Cir. 2004)) (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 4-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993) ("Since the death penalty differs from other criminal penalties in its
finality, defense counsel in a capital case should respond to this difference by making extraordinary
efforts on behalf of the accused.")).
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embodied in our concept of humanity" 36 -that the "team approach" to
capital litigation mandated by the ABA Guidelines is so critical.
4. The Importance of the "Team Approach" in Capital Cases
I did not fully appreciate the nature and importance of a "team
approach" to a capital case at the time that I appointed counsel in
Johnson and Honken. Jill Miller, a nationally recognized death penalty
mitigation specialist, wrote a decade ago that "[t]he skills and expertise
required to effectively represent a capital client are broad and multidisciplinary in nature, thus requiring a team approach., 37 Miller then
discussed several advantages of the "team approach":
Use of the defense team concept in the trial of capital cases ensures
that clients facing the death penalty will be provided with
representation that includes the combination of skills and expertise
required for high quality advocacy. The exchange of views and
perspectives of the various members of the team can produce more
effective strategy. In addition, utilizing a team approach means that the
burden of responsibility for saving the client's life will be shared. The
trial of a capital case can be extraordinarily demanding
and stressful.
38
The team becomes a support system for each member.
The importance of the "team approach" did not hit home for me
until I heard deeply disturbing testimony, some of which came from
former legal assistants and investigators for the death penalty trial
counsel in Johnson's § 2255 post-conviction proceeding. 39 Because I
was unable to appreciate the full impact and necessity of the "team
approach" at the time I appointed counsel, I made at least one critical
mistake (although probably more than just one). Having appointed a
third attorney, I was very concerned about duplication of efforts and
having counsel divide up the labor to avoid what I perceived, at the time,
to be unnecessary, overlapping, and duplicative work. In hindsight, I
now understand that my voicing of this concern may have undermined a
"team approach" to Johnson's representation. On the other hand,
36. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
37. Jill Miller, The Defense Team in CapitalCases, 31 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2003).
38. Id. at 1123. Miller also points to the Commentary of the ABA Guidelines to support her
argument for the "team approach." Id.(quoting ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 10.4
cmt., at 1002). The Commentary to Guideline 10.4 states:
The team approach enhances the quality of representation by expanding the knowledge
base available to prepare and present the case, increases efficiency by allowing attorneys
to delegate many time consuming tasks to skilled assistants and focus on the legal issues
in the case, improves the relationship with the client and his family by providing more
avenues of communication, and provides more support to individual team members.
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 10.4 cmt., at 1002 (footnote omitted).
39. See, e.g., Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 814.
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Johnson's team turned out to be so dysfunctional that, had I encouraged
more trial team meetings and conferences, I doubt that it would have
made a difference. 40 As Johnson's § 2255 proceeding unfolded, I was
able to appreciate the substantial number of ways trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance, and the massive amount of evidence of such
ineffective assistance. Unbeknownst to me, the dysfunction of Johnson's
trial team occurred very early in their representation--during critical
plea negotiations.41 A trial team paralegal, the very paralegal that had
sixty-four percent of the entire legal team's contact with Johnson
(including contact by experts), became convinced of Johnson's legal
innocence, and, thus, was diametrically opposed to the position of
learned counsel and the team mitigation specialist, who believed that it
was virtually impossible for Johnson to be found not guilty. 42 This drove
a huge and unnecessary wedge between the trial team and their client-a
wedge that was not even known to learned counsel at the time.43 In other
40. In my lengthy opinion granting Johnson § 2255 relief, I observed the following, regarding
the level of dysfunction of the trial team:
The level of dysfunction in the defense team is demonstrated, for example, by a
series of exhibits summarizing client contact with Johnson. Exhibit 66 details and totals
the hours of in-person client contact by all members of the defense team during
Johnson's incarceration from August 2000, when the attorney identified herein as Lead
Counsel appeared to represent her on the original non-capital charges, through December
19, 2005, the day before her sentencing hearing after her conviction on capital charges. It
shows the following hours of in-person client contact by the "core" defense team: Lead
Counsel, 42 hours; Learned Counsel, 62.9 hours; Co-Counsel, 5.6 hours; Waterloo
Counsel, 3.8 hours; a paralegal, 371 hours; the mitigation specialist, 10.2 hours; and the
original investigator, 4.6 hours. The gross imbalance between the hours of client contact
by the paralegal and the other members of the defense team is obvious. That gross
imbalance appears even more glaring from a bar chart ... and a pie chart ... which
summarize all contacts with Johnson, including telephone contacts that she initiated, as
well as in-person contacts, drawn from billing records. The pie chart indicates the
following percentages of contact time, as follows: Lead Counsel, 17%; Learned Counsel,
12%; Co-Counsel, 1%; Waterloo Counsel, 1%; mitigation specialist, 3%; original
investigator, 2%; and paralegal, 64%. There is no excuse for a paralegal to have three
times as much contact with a capital defendant as all of the defendant's trial attorneys
combined, and no excuse for a mitigation specialist and investigator to have so little
contact time. The relatively small amount of contact that the attorneys, the mitigation
specialist, and the original investigator had with Johnson indicates that there was little
direct exchange of information between them and Johnson and little opportunity for
these key members of Johnson's defense team to develop the necessary rapport with
Johnson to represent her effectively.
Id. at 680 n.3 (citation omitted). I note that the ABA Guidelines require that "[c]ounsel at all stages
of the case should engage in a continuing interactive dialogue with the client concerning all matters
that might reasonably be expected to have a material impact on the case." ABA GUtDELINES, supra
note 14, Guideline 10.5(C), at 1005.
41. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
42. Id.
43. 1observed:
I find it very troubling that trial counsel were unable to present Johnson with a
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words, at least two of the three lawyers on the trial team were convinced
of Johnson's guilt, while a paralegal was reinforcing Johnson to assert
her innocence. 44 Not only was there a total lack of a "team approach," as
the statistical information about contact time with Johnson reveals, 45 but
all three attorneys on the trial team failed the basic command of
Guideline 10.5.A: "Counsel at all stages of the case should make every
appropriate effort to establish a relationship of trust with the client, and
should maintain close contact with the client.",46 The lack of a "team
approach" may have been as responsible for the death penalty verdict as
any other factor-including the tragic multiple murders that involved the
deplorable execution of two young children. As noted in the final
sentence of the Commentary to Guideline 9.1, "Funding and
Compensation": "For better or worse, a system for the provision of
defense services in capital cases will get what it pays for" 47 --or not.
Neither Johnson nor the taxpayers received what they should have,
where defense costs exceeded $1.5 million, even in a case that cost the
taxpayers several multiples of that figure, all told.48 Failing to pursue the
"team approach" mandated by the ABA Guidelines can, and did in
Johnson's case, lead to disastrous results.
unified message that her only realistic course was to accept a plea agreement to life
imprisonment; that they did not spend more time with Johnson, and sooner, discussing
plea options; that they did not do more, and sooner, to marshal and confront Johnson
with evidence suggesting that a plea to a life sentence was the only realistic option; and
that they did not do more, and sooner, to enlist the aid of family members and others to
convince her to plead guilty to the charges in order to escape the death penalty. As a
specific example, Johnson's trial counsel actually delegated the vast majority of the
client contact not to an attorney on the team, or even to the mitigation specialist, but to a
paralegal ....Worse still, [the paralegal] commiserated with Johnson, believed in her
innocence, and reinforced rather than dampened Johnson's belief that she could be
acquitted, a position very much at odds with that of Leamed Counsel and the mitigation
specialist. Thus, delegation of client contact to a paralegal undermined the capacity of
trial counsel and other members of the defense team to present a unified message to
Johnson that her best and only realistic hope was to plead guilty in exchange for a
sentence to life imprisonment without parole. Being very troubled with these
circumstances, however, is short of finding that her trial counsel's performance in these
respects was professionally incompetent.
Id.(citing Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 791 (2011)). 1 went on to hold that trial counsel
provided ineffective assistance in other aspects of the plea negotiations, but that Johnson failed to
prove prejudice. Id. at 782-91.
44. Id. at 782.
45. See id.
at 680 n.3.
46. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 14, Guideline 10.5(A), at 1005,
47. Id.Guideline 9.1 cmt., at 988; see also Martinez-Macias v. Collins, 979 F.2d 1067, 1067
(5th Cir. 1992) (granting habeas relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel where "[t]he state
paid defense counsel $11.84 per hour," and "[u]nfortunately, the justice system got only what it paid
for"),
48. The actual plethora of attorney fees and expert witness vouchers are on file with the Clerk
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
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5. The Appointment of Counsel
Let me start with the importance of Guideline 4.1, "The Defense
Team and Supporting Services," and Guideline 5.1, "Qualifications of
Defense Counsel. 'A9 Normally, judges in our district, and, as I
understand it, in most if not all districts, are not involved in any way50
with the appointment of Criminal Justice Act of 1946 ("CJA")
counsel-other than to vet whether a lawyer is competent to be initially
placed on the CJA panel. I personally vetted and selected the defense
teams for Johnson and Honken. I am not sure that this was a good idea,
but our Federal Public Defender's Office was conflicted out. Upon
immediately determining that this case was factually complex, with
multiple murders several months apart, and legally complex, because
death is different, I appointed three criminal defense lawyers for each
defendant.5 1 Iowa abolished the death penalty in 1965.52 Thus, there
were no Iowa attorneys in practice, that I knew of, with death penalty
experience. I selected two of the four finest criminal defense lawyers in
the state for each defendant's defense team. All four had been before me
on many federal criminal cases. I knew that two of those attorneys had
worked together on many other high profile cases, so I put them together
on one defendant's team. I asked each team to do a national search by
consulting the death penalty resource counsel in the Federal Public
Defender system to find "learned" death penalty counsel who they
53
would be comfortable working with for the third member of each team.
49. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 4.1, at 952; id.
Guideline 5.1, at 961. These
Guidelines were not yet promulgated at the time I appointed counsel in both Johnson and Honken.
See id.
intro., at 916 (stating that the revised ABA Guidelines were adopted in 2003).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 3600A (2006). CJA counsel refers to counsel appointed pursuant to the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, which provides for the appointment and payment of counsel for
indigent criminal defendants in federal court. Id.
51. See Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 687 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
52. Iowa carried out forty-five executions between 1834 and 1965. See Iowa, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state bystate (last visited Feb. 16,
2014). Victor Harry Feguer, a convicted murderer, was the last federal inmate executed in the
United States before the moratorium on the death penalty following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972), and the last person put to death in the state of Iowa. See Carey Goldberg, Federal
Executions Have Been Rare but May Increase, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,2001, at 26. On March 15, 1963,
Feguer requested a single unpitted olive for his last meal hoping to grow an olive tree above his
burial site. See id.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2006). Concerning counsel and witnesses in capital cases, it is required
that the trial court judge appoint at least two defense counsel, "of whom at least I shall be learned in
the law applicable to capital cases." See id.
In addition to the learned counsel requirement of § 3005,
the minimum experience standards for counsel appointed in federal capital cases are contained in
§ 3599. Id.§ 3599(a)-(d). Additional procedures for appointment of counsel and qualification
requirements are further detailed in § 620 of the Guide to Judiciary Policies. 7 GUIDE TO JUDICIARY
POLICY § 620 (2013). At the time of the capital cases against Honken and Johnson, however, 21
U.S.C. § 848, under which they were charged, included provisions for appointment of counsel and
expert witnesses in capital "conspiracy murder" and "CCE murder" cases comparable to the
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After each team of Iowa lawyers had selected their proposed learned
counsel, I personally vetted that lawyer with federal judges in the
jurisdiction where the lawyer resided, and with other judges whom the
learned counsel had appeared before in capital cases. I thought I had
selected two defense "dream teams." Never in my wildest imagination
could I have foreseen that one of these "dream teams" would turn into
my worst judicial nightmare years later-a nightmare that unfolded in a
§ 2255 ineffective assistance of counsel proceeding spanning most of
2011-that included over eighteen days of testimony, four phases of
evidence, nearly sixty witnesses, and thousands of pages of exhibits.54
One of the lessons learned is that the "chemistry" of the defense
trial team is vital to provide constitutionally effective assistance of
counsel. This chemistry problem is magnified when the lawyers on the
defense team are separated by significant distances-not only from each
other, but also from their client-and are not previously acquainted with
one another. Because states that do not have the death penalty are
unlikely to have learned counsel within their borders, this is a recurring
problem in those federal capital cases brought in jurisdictions with no
state death penalty.
Johnson's defense team was appointed prior to the 2003 adoption
of the ABA Guidelines; had they understood the importance of a "team
approach," I believe the lawyers would have worked together far more
cohesively.5 5 Instead, they never developed a unified theory of the
defense or a consistent and cohesive mitigation strategy with each other.
Their fractured approach seriously affected the conflicting advice and
signals that they gave their client about plea negotiations, and seriously
undermined the effectiveness of these negotiations with the prosecution
because the three lawyers were never on the same page. Instead of
working as a team, they worked as they usually do in non-capital
cases-as lone wolves. In this sense, the Johnson defense team also
seriously ran afoul of ABA Guideline 10.10.1, "Trial Preparation
Overall," which requires counsel to formulate an approach that
integrates the guilt phase with the penalty phase, if there is one.5 6 The
Commentary to this Guideline requires that "well before trial, counsel
provisions currently found in 18 U.S.C. § 3005. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 848(q) (2000), with 18 U.S.C.

§ 3005.
54. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 689-92.
55. The need for teamwork was not a revelation in 2003. See Miller, supra note 37, at 1121
n.30 (citing SUBCOMM. ON FED. DEATH PENALTY CASES, COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVS., JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY CASES: RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCERNING THE COST AND QUALITY OF DEFENSE REPRESENTATION sec. 1(B)(4) (1998)); id.at
1123 & n.51 (discussing an interview with Millard Farmer, who coined the term "Team Defense" in
capital cases as the post-Furmanera began).
56. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 10.10.1, at 1047.
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formulate an integrated defense theory that will be reinforced by its
presentation at both the guilt and mitigation stages."57 This Guideline
further requires that this integrated defense theory approach should be
advanced from
jury selection through closing arguments, and all phases
58
in between.
In hindsight, even without obvious warning signs to alert me to the
serious lack of a "team approach," I should have been more vigilant to
ensure the proper approach. I had numerous ex parte on the record
conversations with the defense team that provided me with opportunities
to gently explore whether they were really working as a "team" in the
sense promulgated by the ABA Guidelines. My natural reluctance to
interfere with the defense function, and my erroneous belief that,
because the three lawyers were each outstanding in their own right, they
would work together seamlessly, blinded me to the possibility that my
hand-selected "dream team" was anything but. Also, it was not until
years later, in the § 2255 proceeding, that I began to fully understand the
critical need for the "team approach." I would strongly encourage judges
presiding over capital prosecutions not to repeat my mistakes. Looking
back, I was naive to think that, merely because I had appointed three
excellent criminal defense lawyers, my obligation to ensure competent
capital representation was complete. Following the appointment of
counsel, I was presented with so many daunting motions and issues that
it never dawned on me that the defense's lack of a "team approach"
would ultimately undo years of effort by many-including the
outstanding prosecution team and many dedicated law enforcement
officers-and waste literally millions of taxpayer dollars.
At bottom, merely appointing the defense team should not end a
trial court's duty to ensure that the defense team is actually functioning
consistently with the Sixth Amendment's command of effective
assistance of counsel and the ABA Guidelines. 5 9 Trial court judges in
capital cases need to be aware that the sum of the parts of a defense
team is not always greater than the whole; indeed, it can be far lesswith dire consequences.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in § 2255 Proceedings
1. Introduction
At the other end of the arc in capital cases, the Omega, is the
inevitable review in post-conviction proceedings, all too often focusing
57. Id. Guideline 10.10.1 cmt., at 1047-48 (footnote omitted).
58. Id. at 1048.
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 10.1, at 989.
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on the disturbing question: was trial counsel constitutionally ineffective
in violation of the Sixth Amendment? 60 Of course, because there will be
a new post-conviction team that may or may not be the appellate team,
some of the same issues that a trial court judge sees in the appointment
of counsel for the trial team may arise for that of the post-conviction
team-but, probably to a lesser degree in most cases, just not in mine.
My experience teaches that trial court judges need to be vigilant when
appointing the post-conviction team as well. This is because death
penalty post-conviction relief proceedings can be as complex and
daunting as the original trial. Indeed, Johnson's § 2255 proceeding
raised enormously complex procedural issues. For example, the § 2255
6
motion was 176 pages long, and asserted sixty-three grounds for relief. '
In describing these proceedings, I wrote:
This federal habeas proceeding nearly rivaled the complexity of
Johnson's trial. It involved 18 days of evidence, in
four different phases, spanning most of 2011. Fifty-nine witnesses
testified and thousands of pages of exhibits were admitted, followed
by
62
hundreds of pages of briefing and a full day of oral arguments.
Numerous ineffective assistance of counsel claims were asserted
attacking the original trial team for constitutional errors in the pretrial,
jury selection, merits, and penalty phases, as well as in the post-trial
and appellate phases. 63 The prosecution asserted that twenty-one of
the sixty-three claims raised by Johnson were time-barred for a variety
of reasons.64
For Johnson's § 2255 team, lawyers were needed who not only
knew capital law but were also well versed in habeas litigation. 65 As this
combination was also lacking among Iowa lawyers, I relied on the
proceeding recommendation of death penalty experts outside of the

60. The U.S. Supreme Court first held that indigent defendants, at least in capital cases, had a
right to effective assistance of counsel in Powell v. Alabama. 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). Powell relied
on the Due Process Clause because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet been
incorporated. John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, "It's Like Deja Vu All Over Again ": Williams
v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial)Return to the Guidelines Approach
to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 130 (2007). The Court then
gravitated to the Sixth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28
(1967). For a detailed explanation of the evolution of the right to the effective assistance of counsel
and a discussion of the evolving "tests" for establishing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
see Blume & Neumann, supra,at 130-41.
61. Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 677-79 (listing, in the opinion's Table of Contents, Johnson's § 2255 claims).
64. Id at 697.
65. See 2255 Project Offers Help, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/news/
TheThirdBranch/08-06-01/2255_ProjectOffersHelp.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2014).
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state.66 The rrsum6s of the new lawyers suggested to conduct the § 2255
post-conviction proceeding looked extremely promising. It was clear
who "learned counsel" would be, and that he would serve as the leader
of the new team. He was very experienced and, on first impression (he
flew to Iowa to meet me), charming and dedicated death penalty
specialist from Maryland. Unfortunately, however, it emerged over time
that the representation provided by this "learned counsel" was
appallingly inadequate. Two years later, I would end up removing the
§ 2255 defense team shortly before the scheduled hearing and file my
first-ever formal disciplinary grievance against a lawyer.67 Johnson,
meanwhile, was certainly not receiving the kind of representation
envisioned by the Guidelines.68 Little did I realize, years earlier when
I appointed the original defense team, that appointment of counsel
issues would literally
plague Johnson's death penalty prosecution for
69
more than a decade!
Out of painful necessity, I appointed a second team for Johnson's
post-conviction § 2255 proceeding. 70 That team, led by an outstanding
death penalty specialist, Michael Burt of San Francisco, was truly and
finally a judge's "dream team., 71 Burt was brilliant, zealous but
reasonable, reliable, impeccably honest and candid, and worked
exceptionally well with his equally well-qualified, talented, and
exceptionally professional opposing counsel, C.J. Williams. Williams,
an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Iowa, was also
lead counsel for the prosecution in both Johnson's and Honken's death
penalty trials, appeals, and § 2255 proceedings.72
2. The Role of the ABA Guidelines in § 2255 Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Proceedings
In preparation for Johnson's § 2255 proceeding, and before hearing
extensive evidence from nearly sixty witnesses, I undertook the task of
reading every reported post-Furman73 § 2255 and related federal death
penalty decision. In doing so, I realized that defense counsel failures in
the penalty phase, rather than the guilt phase, were not only far and away
the most frequent basis of § 2255 claims, but also created the most
difficult issues to resolve in § 2255 capital litigation.74 The ABA
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.
Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 681.
See id. at 916-18.
For a more thorough discussion of this mess, see id. at 680 n.3.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
"[C]ertain specific duties, such as the duty to investigate [mitigation evidence] ... [have]
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Guidelines, especially Guideline 10.11, "The Defense Case Concerning
Penalty, ' 75 significantly assisted me in determining whether trial
counsel's alleged failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence
of Johnson's mental health at the time of the five murders rose to the
level of ineffective assistance of counsel.76 Many federal and state courts
have relied on Guideline 10.11 in a variety of contexts to evaluate trial
counsel's performances in the penalty phases of capital cases.77 This is
not surprising because the ABA Guidelines are continually regarded as
the "single most authoritative summary of the prevailing professional
norms in the realm of capital defense practice., 78 Moreover, the ABA
Guidelines have proven especially valuable in "helping courts to assess
the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in death
penalty cases., 79 This is precisely how I utilized Guideline 10.11, and
become the most heavily scrutinized aspect of defense counsel's representation." Blume &
Neumann, supra note 60, at 132.
75. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 10.11, at 1055-58. This Guideline directs
trial counsel to: "investigate issues bearing upon penalty and to seek information that supports
mitigation or rebuts the prosecution's case in aggravation"; engage in early discussions with the
client about the relationship between the strategy of the guilt phase and the penalty phase; discuss
with the defendant the sentencing phase procedures; weigh the consequences of the defendant
testifying; consider the evidence, witnesses, and demonstrative exhibits for the penalty phase;
consider the potential challenges to the prosecution's aggravating evidence; consider challenges to
the prosecution's expert witnesses; interview the defendant; and request jury instructions and
verdict forms that give effect to all mitigation evidence. See id.
76. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 877-98. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the U.S.
Supreme Court Justices' conflicting views on the proper role of the ABA Guidelines in capital
litigation, see Stetler & Wendel, supranote 23, at 656-70.
77. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bagley, 544 F.3d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing ABA GUIDELINES,
supra note 14, Guideline 10.11(F), at 1055-56) (noting that "counsel should consider [Guideline
10.11 's requirements] in deciding what witnesses and evidence to introduce at the penalty phase of
a capital case"); Canaan v. McBride, 395 F.3d 376, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2005) (relying on Guideline
10.11 in finding that defendant's "counsel fell short of professional norms when they failed to
consult with him regarding his testifying at the penalty phase"); Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942
(10th Cir. 2004) (relying, in part, on Guideline 10.11 in holding that "[i]t was patently unreasonable
for [the attorney] to omit [mental health] evidence from his case for mitigation"); Bolin v. Baker,
No. 3:07-CV-00481, 2012 WL 2138160, at *2 (D. Nev. June 13, 2012) (noting that many of the
ABA Guidelines-including Guideline 10.11--"have been employed by the U.S. Supreme Court as
the standard for determining the level of reasonable performance for counsel in a capital case");
United States v. Karake, 370 F. Supp. 2d 275, 278-79 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Guideline 10.11 as one
of many "guideposts" for measuring whether a capital defendant's counsel was effective); State v.
Hausner, 280 P.3d 604, 630 (Ariz. 2012) (en banc) (noting that, under Arizona's criminal rules,
Guideline 10.11 functions as a guideline, but not a requirement); Hall v. McPherson, 663 S.E.2d
659, 668 (Ga. 2008) (holding that "[t]rial counsel's investigation also was not reasonable in light of
[Guideline 10.11(A)] set forth by the American Bar Association"); Henry v. State, 937 So. 2d 563,
573 (Fla. 2006) (noting that Guideline 10.11 "mandate[s] mitigation investigation and preparation,
even if the client objects").
78. Stetler & Wendel, supra note 23, at 635. In the small world of federal capital defense
work, Stetler was also a Strickland expert witness for petitioner Johnson in her § 2255 proceeding.
Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 681, 783.
79. Stetler & Wendel, supranote 23, at 635.
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how it assisted me in reaching the decision to grant Johnson a new
penalty phase re-trial.80
3. Two Examples of ABA Guideline 10.11 in Action
a. Failure to Investigate and Present Evidence of Johnson's
Mental State at the Time of the Five Murders
ABA Guideline 10.11 imposes a general duty that "counsel at every
stage of the case have a continuing duty to investigate issues bearing
upon penalty and to seek information that supports mitigation or rebuts
the prosecution's case in aggravation.'
More specifically, this
Guideline instructs counsel to consider the use of "[e]xpert and lay
witnesses along with supporting documentation ...to provide
psychological.., insights into the client's mental and/or emotional state
and life history that may explain or lessen the client's culpability for the
underlying offense(s)." 82
In Johnson's § 2255 proceeding, I found that numerous instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel had permeated her defense.83 However,
none was more troubling than learned counsel's decision not to pursue
psychological mitigation evidence of Johnson's state of mind at the time
of the five murders.8 4 This alleged "strategic decision" was so lacking in
the type of sound pretrial investigation contemplated by Guideline
10.11(F) that I stripped the decision of the presumption in favor of
counsel's strategy, a presumption which generally makes strategic
choices virtually unchallengeable.85 Federal Death Penalty Resource
Counsel Richard Burr had presented learned counsel with a virtual
pretrial mental health mitigation "roadmap" on how to explain Johnson's
participation in the five murders, but learned counsel inexplicably
rejected this advice without a proper pretrial investigation.86 This
massive failure of Johnson's defense team prevented the mitigation
defense from achieving the goal expounded by the Commentary to ABA
Guideline 10.11: "[I]t is critically important to construct a persuasive
narrative in support of the case for life, rather than simply present a
catalog of seemingly unrelated mitigation factors. 8 7 Ultimately, I held:

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 877-94.
ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 10.11(A), at 1055.
Id. Guideline 10.1 l(F)(2), at 1056.
Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 919.
See id.
at 881-91.

85. See id. at 741-42, 881-91.

86. Id.at 881.
87. ABA GUIDELINES, supranote 14, Guideline 10.11 cmt., at 1061.
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[T]he relief I am granting here is not about the case that the jurors
heard, or the appropriateness of their verdict based on that evidence
(which I affirmed on post-trial motions in a 297-page ruling), but
heard, but for
about the case that the jurors did not but should have
88
trial counsel's woefully unconstitutional performance.
In 2008, the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function
of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases ("Supplementary
Guidelines") 89 were promulgated by the ABA to "provide
comprehensive, up-to-date guidance for all members of the defense
team, and [to] provide useful guidance to judges and defense counsel on
selecting, funding and working with mitigation specialists." 90 The
Supplementary Guidelines explain in great detail the expected
professional norms for penalty phase preparation and representation by
the capital defense. 9' For instance, Supplementary Guideline 10.11, "The
Defense Case: Requisite Mitigation Functions of the Defense Team,"
imposes broad and comprehensive duties on the defense team to locate
and interview a host of types of expert and lay witnesses, and to gather
extensive documentation to make the case for life.92 ABA Guideline
88. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (footnote omitted).
89. SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES FOR THE MITIGATION FUNCTION OF DEFENSE TEAMS IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES, in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV.677, 677-78 (2008) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY
GUIDELINES].
90. Id. at 677-78. Maher, the Director of the ABA Death Penalty Representation Project in
Washington, D.C., has explained:
The [Supplementary Guidelines] are a natural and complementary extension of the
ABA Guidelines. They spell out important features of the existing standards of practice
that enable mitigation specialists and defense attorneys to work together to uncover and
develop evidence that humanizes the client. Most importantly, the Supplementary
Guidelines will help defense counsel understand how to supervise the development of
mitigation evidence and direct a key member of the defense team. This guidance is
urgently needed. In my role as Director of the ABA Death Penalty Representation
Project, I often receive inquiries from judges and lawyers about what training and
experience a mitigation specialist should have before being appointed and what his or
her responsibilities in a capital case should be. I also receive calls from mitigation
specialists themselves, frustrated because defense counsel does not understand their role
and what they need by way of support and direction. The Supplementary Guidelines will
provide answers to many of those questions, continuing what the ABA Guidelines began
when they first described the unique role and responsibilities of mitigation specialists.
Robin M. Maher, The ABA and the Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of
Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 763, 770-71 (2008) (footnotes
omitted). Sean D. O'Brien, Associate Professor at the University of Missouri-Kansas City School of
Law, who directed the project that surveyed experienced death penalty practitioners, then drafted
the Supplementary Guidelines, has explained the methodology and the years of work that went into
promulgating the Supplementary Guidelines. See generally Sean D. O'Brien, When Life Dependson
It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty
Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693 (2008).
91.

See generally SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 89.

92. Id.Guideline 10.11, at 689-92.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol42/iss2/2

22

Bennett: Sudden Death: A Federal Trial Judge's Reflections on the ABA Guid

2013]

A FEDERAL JUDGE'SREFLECTIONS

10.11, as supplemented, provides a ready-made checklist for a
comprehensive and thorough mitigation investigation.93
b. The Inadequate Mitigation Jury Instructions
ABA Guideline 10.11(K) specifically addresses defense counsel's
role in preparing, requesting, and objecting to jury instructions in the
penalty phase.94 Further, the Commentary to ABA Guideline 10.11(K)
requires counsel to "request instructions that will ensure that the jury
understands, considers, and gives effect to all relevant mitigating
evidence." 95 This did not happen in Johnson's penalty phase.96 The
§ 2255 evidence established that the mitigation specialist had presented
the trial team with a straightforward list of forty-four mitigating factors,
but counsel had "ignored" this list. 97 Instead of using this list as a guide
for drafting the mitigating factors and placing each in a simple, single
instruction for the penalty phase jury instructions, learned counsel
submitted mitigation instructions that contained multiple mitigating facts
within a single instruction.98 Though I held that this claim was
procedurally barred, I felt that it was important to write extensively
about it "as a cautionary tale." 99 I noted that, "[t]his is true, not least
because the mitigating factors were remarkably poorly drafted,
considering how important they are in a capital case, but also because I
ignored my own significant misgivings at the time, and
submitted... trial counsel's mitigating
factors essentially as proposed, a
00
mistake I now deeply regret."'
In the Johnson § 2255 opinion, as an example of "a deficiently and
prejudicially drafted mitigating factor,"'' 1 I used the ninth mitigating
factor instruction from Johnson's penalty phase verdict form:
(9) Angela Johnson was raised in a single-parent household by an
emotionally unstable mother who subjected her children to unusual
93. See id.
94. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 14, Guideline 10.11 (K), at 1058. Section K provides:
Trial counsel should request jury instructions and verdict forms that ensure that
jurors will be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence. Trial
counsel should object to instructions or verdict forms that are constitutionally flawed, or
are inaccurate, or confusing and should offer alternative instructions. Post-conviction
counsel should pursue these issues through factual investigation and legal argument.
Id.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. Guideline 10.11 cmt., at 1069.
Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 873-76 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
Id. at 873.
See id. at 874-75.
Id.
at 873.
Id.
Id. at 874.
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fasting practices, long periods of abandonment and physical
detachment, and occasional physical abuse, resulting in Angela
Johnson being far more susceptible to escape through illicit drug use, a
series of unhealthy relationships with
02 men, and chronic feelings of
abandonment and poor self-esteem. 1
The problem with this type of mitigation penalty phase instruction is that
it "would have confused jurors as to their ability to consider the potential
mitigating effect of any particular fact, standing alone, or in conjunction
with all of the other facts with which it appeared."' 1 3 This instruction,
asserting one mitigating factor, included at least eight facts that the
jurors were asked to consider in a single grouping:
(1) that Johnson was raised in a single-parent household; (2) that her
mother was emotionally unstable; (3) that her mother subjected her to
unusual fasting practices; (4) that she suffered long periods of
abandonment and physical detachment; (5) that she suffered occasional
physical abuse; (6) that she was susceptible to escape through illicit
drug use; (7) that she had a series of unhealthy relationships with
men; and (8) that she had chronic feelings of abandonment and
low self-esteem.°4
I held that this instruction "required the jurors to reach the specific
conclusion that the first five of these facts actually caused (that is,
result[ed] in) the remaining three, thereby restricting the jurors' ability to
give each fact its full mitigating effect."' 1 5 1 further held:
At a minimum, [the ninth] mitigating factor, as formulated by
Johnson's trial counsel, would have confused jurors as to their ability
to consider the potential mitigating effect of any particular fact,
standing alone, or in conjunction with all of the other facts with which
it appeared. For example, was a juror required to find all of the first
five factors, rather than just one of them, had all three of the specified
results, rather than any one of them, to find that factor (9) was
mitigating? This problem was not isolated to this specific example, as
nearly all of the other mitigating factors were also multifaceted,
convoluted, and/or required the jurors to find that one or more
preconditions or a series of conditions had specific results. 106
I also found that the ineffective assistance of counsel in submitting the
compound and confusing mitigation instructions likely caused
Johnson prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 875.
104.

Id.

105. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
106. Id.
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Washington.10 7 However, no relief was granted because this claim was
procedurally defaulted.' 0 8

III.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The death of victims in death penalty cases is almost always violent
and sudden. In stark contrast, the resulting criminal prosecutions are
complex, seemingly endless, and notable for an obsession with process.
Greater fidelity to the ABA Guidelines will, in the short run, increase the
cost of death penalty litigation because the trial team will do more.
However, death penalty litigation is not a sprint, but a marathon--often
spanning decades. In the long run, greater fidelity to the ABA
Guidelines will cause fewer ineffective assistance of counsel claims to
be raised-at least, fewer meritorious ones-because this greater fidelity
will unquestionably result in significantly improved quality of
representation and decreased delays. Thus, the ultimate cost to the
taxpayers should be less. Also, finality for the victims' families and
loved ones, and the defendants and their families and loved ones, should
be achieved in less time. In my view, greater fidelity to the ABA
Guidelines is a win-win for everyone involved in capital litigation: the
victims' families, defendants and their families, the prosecution team
and law enforcement, the defense team, the trial and appellate judges,
and the taxpayers who fund these enormous expenses.
Based on my thirteen long years of intimate connection with two
federal death penalty cases-from pretrial, to trial, to lengthy appealsand one complex § 2255 proceeding, I have some recommendations for
state and federal judges assigned death penalty cases.
I recommend that every judge assigned a death penalty case be
sent, and strongly encouraged to carefully read and review, the ABA
Guidelines within seven days of the assignment. This should be
accompanied by a short explanation as to why fidelity to the ABA
Guidelines increases the quality of representation, reduces the chances
of major reversible error, and, in the long run, saves valuable resources
and ultimately reduces the costs and delays of capital litigation. I also
believe that a careful reading of the ABA Guidelines would assist trial
judges in changing their traditional mind-set-that of a single appointed
counsel-to the vital importance of the unified team approach that is at

107. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 874, 876 (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at
687). "Where, as here, the mitigating factors, as formulated, precluded jurors from giving
meaningful consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable probability that,
had the jurors been presented with coherent and effective mitigating factors, they would have
reached a different mitigation phase verdict." Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 874, 876.
108. See Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
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the essence of the ABA Guidelines, but so foreign to what we judges
think about the appointment of counsel.
I recommend that judges or others appointing counsel in death
penalty cases require appointed counsel to meet and confer for a lengthy,
initial in-person conference before the trial team of lawyers is finalized.
At least in federal cases, it is critical that learned counsel be comfortable
with the lawyers on the trial team that she will be working with, and vice
versa. This would help achieve the "team approach" so strongly and
necessarily emphasized by the ABA Guidelines in federal cases, and the
same should be true for state court appointments.
I recommend that lawyers appointed in death penalty cases be
required to read and discuss the ABA Guidelines with each member of
the defense team within ten days of appointment (and be compensated
for these efforts), and be required to certify to the assigned judge that
they have done so. Privately retained lawyers should also be provided
with the ABA Guidelines, and be required to file the same certification.
I recommend that, no later than thirty days after their appointment,
defense counsel should be required to file--ex parte and under seal-a
Defense Plan for Representation ("Plan"). The Plan must specifically
outline how the defense counsel's team approach-identifying the roles
and relationships of the defendant, the investigator, the mitigation
specialist, and the other members of the defense team, as required by
ABA Guideline 10.4-will be balanced with the need to avoid
unwarranted duplication of counsel's efforts. The presiding judge
should then require periodic supplementation of the Plan as needed.
I recommend that trial court judges use ex parte contact on the
recordwith the defense team about counsel fees, retention and payment
of expert witness fees, and so forth, to inquire about the functioning of
the trial team not only among counsel but also with the mitigation
specialist, investigator, and other retained experts. The purpose of these
inquiries is to ensure that the trial team is functioning at least at a
minimum level-and hopefully at a much higher level-to comply with
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. Of
course, the trial judge must ensure that she is not interfering with the
defense function. 0 9
109. Professor Adam Lamparello has suggested that overcoming the problem of capital
defendants being represented by the "worst of the worst," and dramatically improving the quality of
capital representation, "contemplates a more active trial court in ensuring that counsel properly
discharges his duty to engage in effective representation and meaningfully advocate on his client's
behalf." Adam Lamparello, Establishing Guidelines for Attorney Representation of Criminal
Defendants at the Sentencing Phase of Capital Trials, 62 ME. L. REv. 97, 102-03 (2010). While the
active trial court is "essential" to his proposal, he also suggests "sweeping changes to (1) the manner
in which capital defendants are represented; and (2) the method by which their cases are reviewed
on appeal." Id. at 102. His proposal requires defense counsel to certify to the trial judge compliance
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Lastly, I recommend that death penalty trial scheduling orders
require lead counsel to certify to the trial court, at least thirty
days prior to the start of jury selection in the guilt phase, that
the defense team has fulfilled its obligation to discover all information
in support of a sentence other than death, as required by the
Supplementary Guidelines." 0
Regardless of one's personal views of the death penalty, greater
fidelity to the ABA Guidelines, and to my modest recommendations,
would help assure that the long arc of the moral universe will bend
towards justice."1

with detailed requirements, as established by a Death Penalty Representation Commission created in
each state. Id. at 140-48. Such requirements would regulate the investigation and trial stages for
effective assistance of counsel. Id. There is some merit to his certification notions-I could envision
a trial court judge requiring the defense team to certify they have complied with the existing ABA
Guidelines. On the other hand, the remainder of his proposal is both unrealistically fanciful (the
creation of state commissions), and, in terms of his proposal for a more active trial court, creates far
more problems than it purports to solve. He proposes that trial courts review the status of counsel's
pretrial investigation, and, when not satisfied, order further investigation. Id. at 147. Lamparello
also proposes that "the trial court shall also have an active role with respect to trial counsel's
preparation and presentation to the jury of the various mitigating evidence that has been compiled."
Id. at 148. This suggestion for unprecedented trial court involvement in the defense preparation and
presentation of mitigation evidence raises a host of constitutional and prudential concerns totally
ignored by Lamparello. For this professor, the "guiding hand of counsel" now becomes the "guiding
hand of counsel [and the trial court]" on behalf of the defendant, both in the pretrial and trial phases.
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
110. See SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDELINES, supra note 89, Guideline 1.1, at 679; id. Guideline
10.11, at 689-92.
111.

See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-63, at

197 (1988) ("[O]ne of [Martin Luthor] King's favorite lines, from the abolitionist preacher
Theodore Parker, [was:] 'The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice."').
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